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Re-Considering Essentialism for Feminist 
Composition Pedagogy: Adrienne Rich's 
"Politics of Location" as a 
Theory of Writerly Agency 
Krista Ratcliffe 
If a feminist calls you an essentialist, you've just been insulted. 
Catherine Stimpson 
For two consecutive years the 4Cs program committee has invited 
me to participate in panels sporting the word essentialism in the title. 
Although grateful for the invitations, I am perplexed because neither 
of my paper proposals mentioned this word. I am troubled too. For 
at the mere hint of the word essentialism, I hear warning voices ringing 
in my head. Specifically, I hear the voice of Catherine Stimpson, who 
uttered the above truism to a crowd of Stephens College women in 
Columbia, Missouri. But if I have learned anything in our profession, 
I have learned that such truisms should continually be questioned. 
So if I question rather than heed the warning voices in my head, I 
recognize that they, as well as my responses to the 4Cs programming 
committees, not only reinforce a static essentialist/anti·essentialist 
binary, but also assume that the question of essentialism has been 
closed. And such a question should remain in question because 
teachers' assumptions about essentialism (un)consciously drive their 
pedagogical practices; for example, assumptions about essentialism 
enable teachers to believe that writing can (not) be taught or that 
learning with (in) language can(not) change students' lives. To keep 
the question of essentialism in play, I want to accept Devoney Looser's 
challenge in "Composing as an 'Essentialist'?": 
It is not so much that so·called "essentialist" work must be 
stopped than that it must be questioned for its historical and 
cultural assumptions and its assumptions about the category "wo-
men." Only then will we be able to talk about feminist composi-
tion theory that not only operates "in a different voice" but with 
voices that more productively accommodate questions of 
difference. (66) 
To explore Looser's challenge, I will re-consider the concept of 
essentialism, i.e., its definitions and their political expediencies in terms 
of feminism. Second, I will re-read Adrienne Rich's "politics of 
location" as a theory of writerly agency, foregrounding its reconsidera-
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tion of essentialism. And third, I will re-imagine Rich's theory of 
writerly agency as the basis for a, not the, feminist composition 
pedagogy. 
Re-Consldering Essentialism 
Feminists and non-feminists alike have been debating the question 
of essentialism for decades, if not centuries. In the past few years, 
however, feminist theorists have grappled anew with this debate, trying 
to define the conceptual category 'woman" so that real historical 
women can avoid biological determinism and promote political action. 
In Essentially Speaking, Diana Fuss reldndles the essentialist/construc-
tionist debate by challenging Aristotle's influential definition of 
essencet and employing John Locke's distinction between real essen-
tialism and nominal essentialism to further her cause.2 Fuss aligns 
Aristotle with Locke's real essentialism, "a belief in the real, true 
essence of things, the invariable and fixed properties which define the 
'what ness' of a given entity" (Fuss xi). She associates constructionists 
with Locke's nominal essentialism, a belief that essence is a linguistic 
construction, "a classificatory fiction we need to categorize and to 
label" (Fuss 4). Unlike Locke, Fuss claims that all real essentialisms 
are actually nominal ones (5).3 But Fuss's revisions still position us 
within the debate about essentialism, and from that position she asks 
us to consider 'whether essences can change and whether construction 
can be normative" (6). 
These questions are necessary because, if essence is fixed, then 
SUbjects are trapped within static structural boundaries and such 
entrapment leads us down the slippery slope to biological determinism 
and, hence, to the impossibility of personal and/or social change. If 
construction can be seen as the order of things, then the slippery slope 
disappears and the impossible becomes the possible. But when asldng 
'whether essences can change and whether construction can be 
normative; we must also ask: can feminists revise the concept of 
essentialism in politically productive ways? 
Many feminist theorists are skeptical about redefining essentialism 
for feminist projects. Linda A1coff claims that, given the received 
history of feminist theory, any discussions of essentialism at this 
particular historical moment are just too enmeshed with Aristotelian 
assumptions to be of much use: "it is difficult to render the views of 
Rich and Daly into a coherent whole without supplying a missing 
premise that there is an innate female essence" (412). Judith Butler 
echoes A1cofrs skepticism and explains that the desire to supply this 
missing premise arises from feminists ' fear that any "indeterminacy of 
gender might eventually culminate in the failure of feminism" (vii); for 
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if we cannot determine what "woman" is, then how can we construct 
an -ism to empower her? Butler argues that this fear affects debates 
about radical feminisms, which too often center around unanswerable 
questions of "origin or cause" of female essence rather than around 
critiques of female essence as the "effect of institutions, practices, and 
discourses" that write our cultures and ourselves (vii-viii). 
Teresa de Lauretis is even more skeptical of the political expediency 
of any concept of essentialism; consequently, she refuses to participate 
in debates about essentialism, i.e., does it or does it not exist, is it 
real or is it nominal, is it immanent and/or is it transcendent. Instead, 
de Lauretis asks us to think "Otherwise' (Daly, Wickedary 153) about 
the issue. Specifically, de Lauretis asks us to reject the idea that a 
missing premise of innate female essence must necessarily be supplied 
in radical feminist theories: 'Why do it at all? What is the purpose, 
or the gain, of supplying a missing premise (innate female essence) in 
order to construct a coherent image of feminism which thus becomes 
available to charges (essentialism) based on the very premise that had 
to be supplied?' (264). Instead, de Lauretis encourages us to concern 
ourselves with: 
developing a theory of the female-sexed or female-embodied 
social SUbject, whose constitution and whose modes of social 
and subjective existence include most obviously sex and gender, 
but also race, class, and any other significant sociocultural 
divisions and representations; [such) a ... theory of the female-
embodied social SUbject [would be) based on its specific, 
emergent, and conflictual history. (267) 
But other feminist theorists argue that thinking Otherwise about 
essentialism need not mean ignoring the debate. By reading all 
essentialisms as nominal, Fuss refutes the tradition of real essentialism 
and claims that the 'deconstruction of essentialism, rather than putting 
essence to rest, simply raises the discussion to a more sophisticated 
level' (20); moreover, she concludes by asserting that 'politics emerges 
as feminism's essence" (37). Another more sophisticated discussion 
about essentialism emerges in French feminist theory. In 'The Laugh 
of the Medusa,' Helene Cixous exhorts woman to write (to) woman 
and man (to) man. A rereading of Lacanian psychoanalytic theory, 
Cixous' exhortation merges the Real, the Symbolic and the Imaginary 
so as to construct woman's body without resorting to either term in 
Locke's binary. A frequently misinterpreted redefinition of essentialism 
is Mary Daly's refutation of both real and nominal traditions. Daly 
argues that essence refers to a 'Self" that is constantly 'becoming' in 
the patriarchal "foreground' and the radical feminist 'Background" 
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while simultaneously participating in "Becoming" (Daly's conception of 
a deity) (Gyn/Ecology 26; Pure Lust 2); these interwoven processes 
inextricably interweave immanent and transcendent realms (Pure Lust 
60-1). By defining "becoming" as a voyage that leads to both "the 
discovety and the creation of a world other than patriarchy," Daly 
posits essence as always already in process (Gyn/Ecology 1).4 
As demonstrated by Fuss, Cixous, and Daly, essence can be 
redefined. When posited not as original, pure, or fixed, but as a 
process, essence loses its status as a privileged signifier. As a result, 
essentialism need not be considered either a static biological deter-
minism that traps women or a totalizing linguistic game that constructs 
them; instead it may be defined as a subject-in-process. This definition 
empowers both women and men while recognizing the differences both 
between and among them. The implications of such a definition are 
enormous. Such an essentialism would allow the signifier to stay in 
play while Simultaneously allowing spaces for pOlitical action; or as 
Joan Scott claims, "If in our histories we relativize the categories 
woman and man, it means, of course, that we must also recognize the 
contingent and specific nature of Oll.r political claims" (145). Such a 
move does not force us to reject politics nor to embrace an all-
accepting pluralism; instead it challenges us to critique our categories, 
to question our truths that are based on these categories, and to revise 
our actions based on these assumed truths. 
Thinking Otherwise about essentialism enables us to read Adrienne 
Rich's politics of location as a feminist theory of writerly agency that 
constructs a space for identity and for change. Viewed from the site of 
composition studies, Rich's feminist theory of writerly agency can 
inform a feminist composition pedagogy. Such a pedagogy foregrounds 
the functions of gender as it intersects with other categories (e.g., race, 
class, sexual orientation, nationality); as such, it attempts to empower 
real historical students, particularly real historical women students, by 
helping them to recognize their own politics of location and negotiate 
such positions. 
Re-Reading Rich's "Politics of Location" as a Theory of Writerly 
Agency 
Rich posits a pOlitics of location that may be read as assuming an 
essence-in-process. She describes her own location as follows: "I need 
to understand how a place on the map is also a place in history within 
which as a woman, a Jew, a lesbian, a feminist 1 am created and trying 
to create" ("Notes Toward a Politics of Location" 212). But such a 
location is not a simple identity politics with neat, unblurred catego-
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ries. Instead, it is immeasurably complex, as exemplified when Rich 
critiques her previous statement: 
... the woman trying to fit racism and class into a strictly radical-
feminist analysis finds that the box won't pack. The woman who 
seeks the experiential grounding of identity politics realizes that 
as Jew, white, woman, lesbian, middle-class, she herself is a 
complex identity: her U.S. passport, in this world, is part of her 
body, and she lives under a very specific patriarchy. (Blood, 
Bread, and Poetry xii) 
Rich analyzes this complexity in order to define her own subjectivity, 
and in the process she discovers that these definitions change from 
year to year, day to day, essay to essay, poem to poem. Thus, if we 
read these categories not as real or nominal essentialisms but as 
interwoven essences that are becoming, then Rich's politics of location 
emerges as a space of writerly agency. 
This writerly agency does not presume an autonomous will that can 
single-handedly overcome structural oppression; neither does it 
presume a human subject relegated only to a discursive position. What 
it does presume is a space of limited agency where a woman can make 
choices. One Rich persona is optimistic about this agency and its 
possible choices: "Wben / I speak of an end to suffering I don't mean 
anesthesia. I mean know- / ing the world, and my place in it, not in 
order to stare with bitter- / ness or detachment, but as a powerful and 
womanly series of / choices ... : ("Sources; Your Native Land Your Life 
4-8). Rich chooses choices carefully, anticipating Rosemary Hennessy's 
warning: 
Like identity and experience, tbe notion of 'choice,' so embedded 
historically in the humanist ideology of the 'free' individual, 
cannot simply be invoked [but) has to be rewritten so as to map 
out more coherently the mechanisms--both discursive and 
nondiscursive--that affect the historical availability of particular 
positions to some subjects and not others as well as movements 
across and between them. (74) 
Thus Rich's politics of location does not ask whether choices exist but 
rather what kinds of choices are available at particular locations for 
particular subjects. 
When considered as a theory of writerly agency, Rich's politics of 
location foregrounds gendered possibilities and gendered constraints of 
writers' choices, particularly women writers' choices. To make these 
possibilities and constraints visible, Rich chooses memory and 
geography as controlling metaphOrs of her politics of location. 
Memory implies re-vision, both personal and cultural: 
THE WRITING INSTRUCTOR WINTER 1994 
" 
60 Re-Considering Essentialism 
The act of looking back, of seeing with fresh eyes, of entering 
an old text from a new critical dimension--is for women more 
than a chapter in cultural history: it is an act of survival. Until 
we can understand the assumptions in which we are drenched we 
cannot know ourselves. And this drive to self-knowledge, for 
woman, is more than a search for identity: it is part of her 
refusal of the self-destructiveness of male-dominated society. 
('When We Dead Awaken' 35) 
To emphasize the materiality of this re-visioning memory, Rich links 
it to a cultural, textual, and psychological geography: it is 'a difficult 
and dangerous walking on ice, as we try to find language and images 
for a consciousness we are just coming into, and with little in the past 
to support us' (35). This geographical metaphor invokes uncharted 
regions of possibility, which are both exciting and harrowing. Com-
bined, the memory and geography metaphOrs identify rhetorical 
situations of re-visioning writers as 'borderlands' between past and 
present, different interpretations, different truths, and different writers 
and readers. Within these borderlands women often confront problems 
that men may not: '( think it has been a peculiar confusion to the girl 
or woman who tried to write because she is peculiarly susceptible to 
language. She goes to poetry or fiction looking for her way of being 
in the world ... and over and over in the 'words' masculine persuasive 
force' she comes up against something that negates everything she is 
about' (39). But this realization does not free women from the 
problems of language, for as one Rich persona admits, 'this is the 
oppressor's language / yet I need it to talk to you' ('The Burning of 
Paper Instead of Children,' Adrienne Rich 's Poetry 2.17-18). Thus, not 
content simply to identify these gendered possibilities and constraints 
upon women's agency, Rich also analyzes their implications for women 
writers in the following ways: 
• A woman writer may retreat into the dream of a common language 
and try to communicate with other women and men as if they all 
shared the same SUbject position in the symbolic, i.e., as if their 
politics of location were all identical. Living with(in) such a dream 
is not easy for a woman writer, for she frequently fails in her attempts 
to communicate from this position. To understand her failure, she 
must awaken from this dream, a movement one Rich persona likens 
' to wak[ing) from drowning' ('Origins and History of Consciousness,' 
The Dream of a Common Language 11.7) . 
• Once awakened from the dream of a common language, a woman 
writer must resist being relegated to an uneasy, static silence that 
denies the reality of her politics of location. That is, she must resist 
others' attempts to relegate her to this silence, and she must resist her 
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own temptation to retreat into this "safe" silence. Even though this 
aware-but-mute option appears to be the safest route, it is actually 
unhealthy. The unsaid words do not disappear but build up (un)con-
sciously in a woman's mind and body and eventually surface whether 
she wants them to or not. So what appears to be the easiest option 
is actually "the hardest thing to learn" ("An Unsaid Word," Adrienne 
Rich's Poetry 7). 
• Because different kinds of silence exist, a woman writer may choose 
a silence that is neither uneasy nor static. For example, Rich 
celebrates Emily Dickinson's powerful silence: 'you chose I silence for 
entertainment, I chose to have it at last I on your own premises" ("I 
Am in Danger--Sir--," Adrienne Rich's Poetry 21-24). But such silence 
demands a politics of location that affords the luxury of retreating from 
the world, and far too many women lack such privilege. Moreover, 
romanticizing such silence fosters a belief in an autonomy that is 
impossible to achieve and can result in a woman beating herself up for 
not being able to attain this impossibility. 
• If a woman writer chooses not to be silent, she may opt to repress 
her emotions, especially anger, and speak "calmly." This option entails 
consciously playing to the logics of the dominant discourses and 
downplaying the logics of her particular politiCS of location, although 
the two need not be mutually exclusive. Such a move has advantages 
as demonstrated by the Rich persona whose brother-in-law just 
happens to be a psychiatrist: "If 1 stay within the bounds they can't 
come and get me" ("Contradictions," Your Native Land Your Life 4.11). 
But this move has disadvantages as well. It means staying within pre-
established boundaries that may not allow a woman writer room to 
write, speak, or be (sane). 
• A woman writer may try to express the different logics that emerge 
from her own politics of location, not as a challenge to dominant 
logics but as a means of establishing a Rogerian communication with 
them. Such a move tries to bridge the gap between men and women, 
which "hangs between us I older and stranger than ourselves" ("From 
an Old House in America," Adrienne Rich's Poetry 5.7-8). Although 
such a gap can never be totally bridged, communication can occur. 
But it can be exhausting. And unfortunately, it usually entails writing 
and speaking in terms that dominant logics can accept. 
• A woman writer may write from her own politics of location, 
primarily for herself and secondarily for others. Although Rich 
celebrates using a politics of location as a writerly agency, particularly 
for developing a strong writerly voice and womanly sense, her 
recognition of Emily Dickinson's chosen sile!1ce acknowledges a 
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recognition that particular historical moments call for particular actions 
for particular people. Moreover, the complexity of a politics of 
location complicates what it means to be a woman writer who writes 
for herself. For a woman writer has multiple subject positions, and 
these positions are not static. Thus, a writing process that would 
enable a woman writer to write (to) herself would be constantly 
evolving. 
How does Rich conceptualize such writing processes? She does not 
offer one process every woman writer can employ. Instead she argues 
that composing processes are closely linked with each woman writer's 
evolving subjectivity. To model this claim, Rich articulates her own 
writing process--which celebrates "women trying to speak with women 
/ the sUbject is how to break a mold of discourse, / how little by little 
minds change / but that they do change ... ' ('Turning,' Time's Power 
4.8-11). For Rich, breaking the mold of discourse means concep-
tualizing strategies that have silenced women in the past and discover-
ing other strategies that may be employed in the present and/or future. 
Like Paula Becker, a Rich persona claims that ' .. .I'm looking every-
where in nature / for new forms, old forms in new places, / ... / I know 
and do not know / what I am searching for' (,Paula Becker to Clara 
Westhoff,' The Dream of a Common Language 20-24). Moreover, this 
looking is both conscious and unconscious: '[w)ithout for one moment 
turning my back on conscious choice and selection, I have been 
increasingly willing to let the unconscious offer its materials, to listen 
to more than the one voice of a single idea' (,Poetry & Experience,' 
Adrienne Rich 's Poetry 89). In addition to disclosing her own inter-
woven subjectivity and writing process, Rich imagines other processes 
that may enable women to write for themselves and for others. But 
whatever the particularities of these processes, their purpose is outlined 
in her 'Transcendental Etude': 'Such a composition has nothing to do 
with eternity, / the striving for greatness, brilliance-- / only with the 
musing of a mind / one with her body ... / with no mere will to mastery' 
(The Dream of a Common Language 165-68, 171). [n four brief lines, 
Rich opens up spaces in composition studies, e.g., the space for 
musing, not just theorizing; the space of body, not just mind; the space 
of discovery, not just mastery; and the space of the historical particular, 
not just the a/historical universal. 
But Rich warns that such writerly agency has consequences. One 
consequence is that a 'thinking woman sleeps with monsters' ('Snap-
shots of a Daughter-in-Law,' Adrienne Rich 's Poetry 3.1). These 
monsters can paralyze women with fear, thus reinforcing existing power 
structures. Yet these monsters may also be reinterpreted in a way that 
motivates women into action, e.g., Comus's Medusa. A second 
THE WRITING INSTRUCTOR WINTER 1994 
• 
Krista Ratcliffe 63 
consequence is that the myths, lore, theories, rituals and languages that 
are so dear to us are suddenly exposed as gendered and sexist and 
rendered subject for re-vision; such realizations are often personally 
painful. And third, those with vested interests in maintaining such 
myths, lore, theories, etc., will fight revisions. What that really means 
is that they will fight the women who are doing the re-visioning. 
Why? Because as Rich's persona says in 'From an Old House in 
America': "Such women are dangerous / to the order of things" 
(Adrienne Rich 's Poetry 16.1-2). Or at least they are perceived to be. 
Re-Imagining a Feminist Composition Pedagogy 
So how does Rich's politics of location as a theory of writerly 
agency inform composition pedagogy? It does not posit one writing 
process as an a/historical structure that will serve all women. It does 
not offer a set syllabus, a set of textbooks, and a sequence of papers 
that will guarantee a feminist teacher emerging in the classroom. 
What it does provide, as demonstrated by the previous sections of this 
article, is a set of gendered assumptions that may inform a teachers' 
pedagogy. Moreover it assumes two important conditions about 
individual subjects and language: that is, it assumes that different 
women occupy particular symbolic positions.s 
Based on these two conditions, teachers cannot expect all women 
to do (x) and all men to do (y). What we as teachers can do, however, 
is challenge our students to consider the following pOSSibilities: 
(1) to identity and analyze the positions from which we have 
spoken, are speaking, and are spoken; 
(2) to play with re-visioning these positions; 
(3) to analyze academic discourse, recognizing how it silences 
and is sustained by particular voices; 
(4) to analyze when, why, and how we fall into dreams of a 
common language, or silence, or playing it safe, etc; 
(5) to articulate feminist definitions of writing classrooms, 
students, teachers, etc., as well as analyze the power systems that 
permeate these definitions; 
(6) to analyze textual strategies used by women and men in 
particular positions; 
(7) to listen to the unconscious, recognizing that we can never 
fully hear it; 
(8) to listen simultaneously to the many voices that inform an 
issue and critique the 'happy pluralism" that attempts to accept 
all these voices; 
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(9) to analyze 'the order of things' in order to contemplate the 
possibility and feasibility of being 'dangerous'; and 
(10) to make visible the functions of language in all of the 
above possibilities. . 
Foregrounding such possibilities in the classroom may help students 
and teachers articulate the limits and possibilities of their own 
agencies. Such articulations may, in turn, help students and teachers 
to understand Rich's persona in 'Sources XXII' who encourages us all 
to identify, and write from, our own politics of location: 
.. .1 think you thought 
there was no such place for you, 
and perhaps there was none then, 
and perhaps there is none now; 
but we will have to make it, we who 
want an end to suffering, 
who want to change the laws of history, if 
we are not to give ourselves away. 
(Your Native Land Your Life 24-28) 
Perhaps not giving ourselves away means seeing past the assumed real 
essentialisms that function in our daily lives (e.g., my student Janet's 
father who, in one breath, offered to send her brother to medical 
school and to find her a rich doctor). Perhaps not giving ourselves 
away means seeing past the assumed nominal essentialisms in our daily 
lives (e.g., Janet's father's claiming he was only joking as if such 
naming of his actions could make his sexism less hurtful). Perhaps not 
giving ourselves away means conceptualizing our politics of location as 
an everchanging essence that constructs space for writerly agency. 
And for feminist teachers, perhaps not giving ourselves or our students 
away means seeing Rich's pOlitics of location as essential to pedagogy. 
No'" 
IFor Aristotle's discussion of substance and essence, see his Melaphysics. He divides 
substance into four categories: "the essence and the universal and the genus are held to 
be the substance of the particular, aod ... the substrate lis1 that of which the rest are 
predicated" (I.VII.315, 17). He then defines "essence" as follows: "Your essence, Ihen, 
is that which you are said to be of your own nature .... Hence the formula of the essence 
of each thing is that which defines the term but does not contain it (I.VJJ.321). 
2Locke posits a two-fold defini tion of real e.ssmce, i.e., that of '''which all natura) things 
are made" and as "a real, but unknown, ronstitution of (a natural thing's] insensible parts" 
(An Essay on Human Utukrslanding 1.27). He defines nominal essence as "so near a 
connexion (between the name and essence], that the name of any sort of thing cannot 
be attributed to any particular being but what has this essence" (I. 27). He further 
argues: 
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That men making abstract ideas, and settling them in their minds with names 
annexed to them, do thereby enable themselves to consider things, and discourse 
of them, as it were in bundles, for the easier and readier improvement and 
communication of their knowledge, which would advante but slowly were their 
words and thoughts confined only to the particular. (1.29) 
3Locke does not define real essence in terms of nominal essence as does Fuss. 
According to Locke, "in a species of simple ideas and modes, [real and nominal essence] 
are always the same; but in substances always quite different" (An Essay on Human 
Understanding 1.29). 
4Daly believes that a demystification of patriarchy is available to both women and men, 
but in a move that gets her labelled a real essentialist radical lesbian separatist, she 
unapologetically focuses on women's voyages. Why? She figures there are enough other 
people in our culture to wony about men's (Beyond God the Father 8, 172-174). 
5Rich concludes her "Notes toward a Politics of Location" by asking "Once again: Who 
is we?" (231). The implied question is: what rs are erased by the we's of white 
feminisms? Such a move complicates white feminist theories, ca lling into question their 
assumptions, their claims, and their implications. 
Krista Ratcliffe is an assistant professor of English at Marquelle University 
in Milwaukee, WISconsin. 
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